Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met in Beijing on May 19–20, signing 20 cooperation documents and a joint declaration on building a "multipolar world," while extending the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation [15][4][10]. The summit, Putin's 25th visit to China, took place days after Trump's own trip to Beijing and amid ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East [6][2]. A large Russian delegation including ministers and CEOs from Rosneft, Gazprom, and Sberbank accompanied Putin [9].

Both leaders framed the partnership as a stabilizing force in a turbulent world. Putin stated that relations had reached "an unprecedented level" and described them as "one of the main stabilizing factors on the international stage" [10][3]. Xi said the two countries had "continuously deepened political mutual trust and strategic cooperation" and warned of a return to the «закону джунглей» (law of the jungle) in international affairs, describing «односторонними действиями и гегемонией урон» (damage inflicted by unilateral actions and hegemony) as excessive [16][15]. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Guo Jiakun said the friendship "will be further deepened and will be more deeply rooted in people's hearts" [6].

Analysts across multiple regions challenged the narrative of equal partnership. Dr. Zheng Runyu of the Centre for Russian Studies at East China Normal University in Shanghai said "both China and Russia need each other, but Russia clearly needs China more than before at the global stage" [2]. Russia accounts for only 4–5 percent of China's total trade, while China has become Russia's dominant economic partner and top buyer of Russian oil and coal [7][11]. ARD's correspondent in Beijing characterized the dynamic bluntly: China "die Hosen an" hat (wears the trousers) in the relationship [12]. Alexander Gabuyev, head of the Carnegie Berlin Center for Russia and Eurasia Studies, explained that on the stalled Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, «Китай хотел бы взять на себя обязательство покупать лишь 10–20 млрд кубометров в год по этой трубе, а остальные 30–40 млрд иметь как необязательную опцию» (China would like to commit to purchasing only 10–20 billion cubic meters per year via this pipeline, keeping the remaining 30–40 billion as an optional lever depending on market conditions and as pressure on other suppliers) [16].

The Power of Siberia 2 pipeline emerged as the clearest test of the partnership's substance. Despite Putin's push for a deal, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged only "progress" and confirmed that "details still need to be agreed and there are no clear timings" [3][11]. Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center, noted that most of the 20 signed documents are non-binding memoranda designed to project momentum, stating that their quantity serves to demonstrate that cooperation «продвигается семимильными шагами» (is advancing by leaps and bounds) [16]. The Moscow Times reported that the failure to set a concrete pipeline timeline came despite Kremlin adviser Yury Ushakov's earlier confirmation that the project would be "discussed in great detail" [9][15].

The back-to-back hosting of Trump and Putin was widely interpreted as a deliberate Chinese strategy. William Yang of the International Crisis Group said Xi "likely wants to remind Trump that Beijing has other solid and robust relationships that it can count on, so Washington can't easily isolate or harm Beijing" [6]. Graeme Smith of the Australian National University stated that "Beijing is loving the optics of this. They're loving being the centre of world attention, and they will be playing it for their domestic audience for all that it's worth" [7]. Chinese foreign policy expert Li Haidong called it «ein hochsymbolischer Moment» (a highly symbolic moment) that a single country had become a destination for two great powers simultaneously [17]. Chinese state media framed Beijing as the new center of world diplomacy [17].

Xi's selective engagement with global conflicts drew attention. He told Putin that a complete ceasefire in the Middle East was of "utmost urgency" and that "resuming hostilities is even more inadvisable," according to Xinhua [3]. Yet he made no comparable public call regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine [2]. The Guardian reported that Xi had privately told Trump that Putin may end up regretting the war [6]. La Repubblica framed Putin's visit as a search for political cover and gas market access amid battlefield difficulties [26].

Energy security calculations added a further dimension. Joseph Webster of the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center said "the Iran war is driving oil prices higher, and China has insecurities about its supplies," suggesting Beijing has incentives to secure overland Russian energy to reduce vulnerability to disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz [14]. Deutsche Welle's Persian service and Iran International both connected the summit to China's efforts to diversify energy routes away from maritime chokepoints [29][33]. Ushakov stated that Russian oil deliveries to China rose 35 percent in the first quarter to 31 million tonnes [17].

A Reuters exclusive published on the eve of the summit reported that the Chinese military secretly trained approximately 200 Russian personnel in 2025, some of whom later fought in Ukraine, citing European intelligence sources [34]. The Kyiv Independent noted this report alongside the summit's signed agreements [8]. No Western defense officials were quoted assessing the security implications, and no Ukrainian government reaction appeared in available coverage.

South Korean conservative outlet The Chosun Ilbo framed the summit through the lens of Korean Peninsula security, connecting joint Sino-Russian criticism of US-led military activities in the region to potential deepening of North Korea-Russia-China security cooperation [25]. Japanese coverage via Kyodo News focused on the summit's implications for US relations, Iran, and the Indo-Pacific balance [24].

Peskov said the main value of the visit lay "in the content, not in the ceremonial aspects" [3]. The next scheduled step is Xi's planned visit to Russia, to which Putin extended an invitation during the summit [12]. The Power of Siberia 2 pipeline remains without a timeline, and the joint multipolar world declaration awaits concrete follow-through.